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PLATO AND THE DOCTRINE OF NATURAL LAW*
HANS KELSEN**
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I. IDEALISTIC AND REALISTIC DOCTRINE OF LAw
As a result of the shocks which the existing social orders have

experienced through two World Wars and the Russian Revolution,
an intellectual movement is becoming increasingly evident in the
Western World-one which, in sharp reaction to a scientific-positivistic
and relativistic philosophy, aims at a return to metaphysics and
theology, and-closely connected with this-to a renewal of the
doctrine of natural law. The proponents of this trend believe they
find valuable support in the philosophy of Plato, whose authority
until recently was virtually uncontested-and in this they are
justified.
Plato's doctrine of Ideas is the boldest of metaphysical speculations,
for it transcends empirical reality farthest; and the intellectual system which he erected is in its total character more nearly theology
than scientific philosophy.
Less successful is the appeal to Plato's authority in an effort to
revive the theory of natural law, an attempt which has been made
recently by two American authors, Joseph P. Maguire' and John
Wild. 2 Wild goes so far as to assert that Plato is the founder of the
*
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theory of natural law.3
The question of whether Plato was a proponent or the founder of
the theory of natural law is significant not only because of the extraordinary role which his philosophy plays in connection with the
intellectual movement mentioned at the outset; it is also important
because an analysis of Plato's social philosophy which considers
this question is highly informative as to the nature and value of the
doctrine of natural law. Such an analysis presupposes, however, a
clear definition of what is meant by "doctrine of natural law."
The so-called doctrine of natural law is a variety of certain theories
of law, which may be designated idealistic, and which, in contrast to
a realistic theory of law, assume that there is, beside and above the
real or positive law established by human acts-custom or legislation
-an ideal law, just or correct. The validity of positive law is therefore traced back to ideal law, i.e., according to these theories, positive
law may be regarded as valid in so far as it corresponds to ideal law.
And thus these theories seek to justify positive law. The idealistic
theories of law, of which the doctrine of natural law is only a particular case, are characterized by a dualism of two legal orders, one ideal
and one real, whereas the realistic theory of law recognizes only one
form of law, positive law, and by not seeking the reason for its
validity in a superior normative order thus dispenses with a justification for positive law. Its proponents confine themselves to description
and structural analysis.
The so-called doctrine of natural law is characterized by its assertion that it is able to find ideal law, i.e., the rules for the correct
and just conduct not only of men but also of things; hence norms
commanding the good and prohibiting the evil, in nature in general
and in human nature in particular. By "nature" is meant empirical
reality, and by "human nature," the actual human condition. The
main thesis of all doctrines of natural law is based on this foundation:
all good is in accordance with nature, all evil is contrary to nature.
Since man is looked on as an essentially reasonable being, and since
it is assumed that the natural law controlling his conduct is to be
found in his reason, the norms of correct, just human conduct are
also represented as a law of reason.
The assertion that norms of the correct, just law are immanent
in the empirical reality of nature could only be proved if an analysis
of this reality could actually show a system of incontestable norms
for the proper conduct of men as such an analysis shows a series of
generally recognized, verifiable causal laws. Despite centuries of
effort in this direction there has been no success. Rather the different
3. WILD, op. cit. supra note 2, at 134.
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proponents of natural law-in contrast to the natural scientists-have
presented the most various and contradictory principles of "natural"
law; 4 they have not been able, by means of the methods of the doctrine of natural law, to prove one of the many natural laws the only
correct one to the exclusion of the others. That which the proponents
of the doctrine of natural law claim to have deduced from nature
is in reality subjective- value judgments which they have projected
into nature and which they retrieve from nature as objectively valid
norms, like a circus-magician producing from his top hat rabbits and
pigeons previously put into it. Nature as empirical reality is an
aggregate of facts causally linked together. It is the answer to the
question, "What is?" and why it is. The answer to the question,
"What ought to be?" therefore can not be found in nature.
Since norms which command good and prohibit evil constitute
values, particularly social values, the assumption that these norms
can be determined by an analysis of empirical reality means that
value is immanent in reality. Thereby the dualism of reality and
value-or more generally formulated-of the "is" and the "ought"is rejected. Thereby disappears as well the contrast between normative and causal law, and therefore the dualism of society and nature.
For the doctrine of natural law, reality is value, the causal law is a
norm, and nature-as in the view of primitives-is society. In respect
to the relationship of the "is" and the "ought" the doctrine of natural
law has a monistic character.
But this monism is in contradiction to the irrefutable fact that the
assertion that something is has a completely different meaning from
the assertion that something ought to be. To this many proponents of
natural law declare that the immanence of value in reality which they
assume does not mean the identity of the two; the "is" and the
"ought" are to be distinguished. But they cannot deny that they
arrive at the "ought" from the "is," that from the fact that something
is they conclude that it ought to be so, that they see as the reason for
something's being valuable, i.e., good, the fact that it is real. This is
an obviously false conclusion.
If the identity of reality and value is assumed, or the possibility of
arriving at value from reality, then value judgments have the same
character as reality-judgments; that is, they are equally objective and
may be proved equally true or false by rational cognition. All relativity of value is thereby rejected; and there is no reason for excluding value judgments from a science of nature or of society.
Nothing then lies in the way of assuming that scientific cognition can
4. See my article; -Kelsen, The Natural-Law Doctrine Before the Tribunal
of Science, 2 WEsT RN PoLITICAL Q. 481 (1949).
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determine not only the appropriate means for realizing presupposed
ends but also the ends which are to be realized.
If reality and value are identical, or if the latter is immanent in
the former, then the reality of nature has essentially a normative
meaning. This may be expressed by saying that nature is an authority
endowed with will and that the proper conduct of men and things,
the good, is that which is willed by nature.
This interpretation of nature has ultimately a religious origin. It
goes back-consciously or unconsciously-to the belief that naturethat is, the world of empirical reality, this world, the world of our
senses-was created by a superhuman, supernatural, divine authority,
and, if not created, is still so ruled, that nature manifests the will
of this divine personage. Without belief in a superhuman, supernatural power the assumption of a normative order immanent in
empirical nature cannot occur. To be sure, many proponents of
natural law in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries maintained
-and many modern renovators of this doctrine maintain again-that
they are able to recognize the will of nature without recourse to the
will of God, that the just and good law would be immanent in empirical nature even if this nature were not created and/or governed
by God. But they would never have come on the thought of natural
law if they did not believe, as they as good Christians did believe,
that a benevolent God has created the world and governs it justly.
Moreover, it makes little difference whether one imagines nature as
being created and governed by God or as God itself because supposed to be a superhuman authority endowed with a norm-giving
will commanding good and prohibiting evil. Animism, too, which
imagines nature to be governed by spirits, was a religion; and
the doctrine of natural law is only an animism of a higher order.
If the good, i.e., the positive value, is asserted to be immanent in
empirical reality as a fact, and not as the relation of a fact to a norm
presupposed by the observer, then the evil, i.e., the negative value,
must also be asserted to be immanent in empirical reality as a fact.
But there the doctrine of natural law falls into an insoluble contradiction which shows more clearly than anything else how untenable is
its basis. For how can evil be real in a nature which wills the good
and which is therefore, according to its essence, radically good? How
can norms, which command the good and prohibit the evil and are
immanent in nature, be counteracted if these norms have the character of natural laws with causal necessity, that is, if their "ought" is a
"must"? How can evil be unnatural, i.e., contrary to nature if good is
natural, i.e., accords with nature only because it is real in nature?
It is the problem of theodicy which the doctrine of natural law can-
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not avoid. It is understandable that in an effort to escape this contradiction one can hit on the desperate thought of simply denying
evil. But in doing so one saws off the limb-so to speak-on which
one is sitting; because, if there is no evil but only good, and if there
can be only good and no evil whatsoever-since in a good nature
there can be only good, and evil has no place-then norms which command good and prohibit evil are senseless. And a doctrine of natural
law as a normative order is then without substance; and positive law,
which reacts against the wrong with sanctions, no matter what form
the wrong may take, is in no way justifiable.
An idealistic theory of law, which does not view ideal law as
immanent in empirical reality as the doctrine of natural law does,
but asserts it to be an emanation of the will of a transcendental
authority can solve the problem of evil in reality in one of two ways:
in the fashion of the gnostic good-evil speculation it can view this
reality as not having been created by the transcendental legal or
moral authority, that is, the godhead, but by a power foreign to the
godhead; or, as in Manichaean religion, it can interpret only the good
in this reality as coming from the godhead, as proceeding from the
principle of good, and visualizes the evil as the work of a contrary
godhead, as the rule of a principle of evil. Empirical reality, in which
good and evil alike are real, thus appears as a battleground of the
two transcendental powers, which are personified in Christian religion
as the good God and the evil Devil. That this theology, in holding
to the omnipotence of God, annuls the dualistic solution to the
theodicy problem and leaves the problem finally unresolved is not
here the question. What does matter is that the dualistic solution
is denied to a doctrine of natural law which maintains that ideal law
is immanent in empirical reality, and that the doctrine is caught in the
self-contradiction of the assertion essential to it that evil is real and
is contrary to nature.

II. THE So-CALFD "DYNAmiC" DocTRIN OF NATURAL LAW
In his interpretation of Plato's social philosophy as a "theory of
natural law" Maguire understands the doctrine of natural law to be a
theory "which posits a universally applicable criterion, and a source
of the moral validity of positive law and positive morality, independent of the legislator, in the case of law, and independent of
society, in the case of the 'unwritten laws' of conduct." 5 This is, however, no definition of the doctrine of natural law, but of an idealistic
doctrine of law which sees the basis of validity of positive law or
positive morality not in these normative orders but in another, superi5. MAGtJME, op. cit. supra note 2, at 151.
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or order; this higher order need not necessarily, as in the doctrine
of natural law, be immanent in empirical reality. It is true that in
Plato's social philosophy such an idealistic doctrine of law can be
found-as we shall see. But this doctrine of law of Plato is in
no way a doctrine of natural law in the specific sense above, in which
this word can be used legitimately and is used in the modern endeavors to renovate this doctrine.
Wild speaks of the doctrine of natural law in this sense and believes he is able to demonstrate such a doctrine in Plato.
Quite correctly Wild emphasizes that the doctrine of natural law
claims to arrive at its result-natural law-through the observation
of empirical reality. For this reason he believes that it may be designated as a "realistic" philosophy. It is, he says, "a realistic tradition
of philosophy, radically empirical in its methodology," since it claims
"to derive all of its basic concepts from the observation of experienced
facts." (Wild 73) If the doctrine of natural law were actually in a
position, as it pretends, to perceive through an analysis of empirical
reality the correct or just order of human conduct, it would in
fact be a realistic theory of law. However, because it cannot do
this-as even the theory of natural law developed by Wild showsbut only projects into reality a normative order which a particular
observer has thought to be ideal, it is-in contrast to its self-interpretation-an idealistic and not a realistic theory of law. What matters
here is the fact, correctly stressed by Wild, that the nature of the
theory of natural law is empirical reality.
According to Wild's correct characterization of the doctrine of
natural law, the values or norms sought by this doctrine are immanent in empirical reality. "The most basic thesis involved in this
theory is that value and existence"-Wild identifies "existence" with
empirical reality---"are closely intertwined with one another." (Wild
64) "There are natural norms embedded in the structure of all material existence." (Wild 68) "Norms that are not man-made must
actually exist in some sense. They must be embedded in the ontological structure of things." (Wild 105) Wild thus accepts the identification of the "is" and the "ought" of reality and value, which is
essential for the theory of natural law. To be sure, he maintains
that the doctrine of natural law does not lapse into the error of this
identification. It only asserts that value cannot be separated from
reality. (Wild 99) But values must still somehow "exist." "If values
do not exist in some way, ethical reflection is much ado about nothing." But since Wild identifies existence and empirical reality, i.e.,
facts, values can be existent for him only as facts. He says, "It is
clear that values and disvalues are facts of some kind." If, as Wild
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assumes, value judgments can be true, "they must refer to some kind
of existent fact." (Wild 66) But since there is only one kind of
existent facts, namely the kind in which facts are existent in empirical
reality, then according to this doctrine of natural law values must
be existent in the same way as facts in empirical reality. Despite
the assertion to the contrary even Wild's doctrine of natural law
identifies "is" and "ought," reality and value.
His doctrine maintains that one can establish in empirical reality
values or norms which represent natural law since this reality is of a
dynamic character. Things are in perpetual flux, and this flux has
as its goal the attainment of that which things do not yet possess.
"[T]he world of nature is in flux towards what is not yet fully
possessed . . . [N]atural entities are in a state of incompletion or
potency and . . . they are ever tending further towards something

they now lack." (Wild 65) The dynamic character of nature manifests
itself in "tendencies." Being or existence has a "tendential character."
(Wild 65) Being or existence is always unfinished and incomplete,
but impregnated, as it were, with a tendency towards fulfillment and
completion. "Finite existence is always unfinished. As such, it is
essentially characterized by tendencies towards fulfillment and completion." (Wild 67) Nature or existence "requires" (Wild 65) this
fulfillment or completion. Therefore this fulfillment or completion of
existence is good, and existence itself, valuable. "If the completion
of existence is good, then existence itself must be valuable." (Wild
64) These tendencies which aim at perfection are the norms of
natural law. With reference to the "perfective tendencies" Wild
says: "When so understood and expressed in universal propositions,
these tendencies are norms or moral laws." (Wild 66) This doctrine
of natural law therefore declines to view norms as separated from
reality and created by men: "This realistic doctrine is inconsistent
with any view which would regard norms as separated from existent
fact or as arbitrary constructions made by man." (Wild 66) Yet if
what exists has the tendency to perfect itself, then everything that
is must at least to a certain degree be as it ought to be, that is,
good. But then it remains unclear why this tendency to the good
does not always reach its goal completely, and quite unclear where
evil comes from. For if the tendency to good is immanent in nature,
this nature must be radically good and must have no place for evil.
In fact Wild sees himself compelled to admit this. He says (Wild
151) that the realistic ethic of the doctrine of natural law "must hold
"
that existence is radically good" and "Evil is non-existence ....
(Wild 146, and likewise 65) This can only mean that evil does not
exist. But since with a negation of evil he would make every ethics
impossible, including his own doctrine of natural law, he cannot
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maintain this consequence which unavoidably follows from his "dynamic interpretation of nature." He must-in contrast to what has
just been quoted-"reject the conclusion that existence as such is
good" (Wild 65) and concede that evil exists. "Indubitable empirical
evidence shows us that evil in some sense really exists, as well as
what is good." (Wild 65) Wild speaks of "positive existent evil."
(Wild 65) He emphasizes that not only good but also evil is a mode
of existence, an existential category. (Wild 107) On the other hand,
he maintains that "existence itself must be good." (Wild 106) That
is the consequence of a theory that the tendency to good is immanent
in all existence. It is in obvious contradiction to the concession of
the existence of evil. If evil exists and existence has a tendential
character, then there must be not only tendencies to good but tendencies to evil as well. But this Wild cannot concede. Therefore he
asserts that evil exists not as the goal of a tendency directed toward
it but as "privation" (Wild 65), "frustration" (Wild 65), or "destruction." (Wild 146) "If existence is deprived of what it requires for
its completion, evil arises." (Wild 65) He defines good as the realization of tendency, evil as prevention of tendency. "When these ontological facts are clearly recognized, the notion of goodness as the
realization of tendency and that of evil as the obstruction of tendency
will no longer seem strange or dubious." (Wild 75) The existential
tendencies are "at first imperfect and incomplete." "They may either
be frustrated with a resulting evil, or completed with a resulting
good." (Wild 65) This is in contradiction to the thesis at the bottom
of the dynamic theory that all finite existence is always incomplete.
For if good is the result of the fulfillment of existential tendencies,
there can be no good at all-since all existence is final and incomplete. This in turn contradicts the other assertion that all existence
is radically good. Therefore, good cannot exist in the fulfillment of
tendencies, but only in the tendencies themselves, provided that these
are directed at the good.
But if, as Wild must concede, evil also exists-if only as the obstruction of fulfillment or completion of a tendency-then there must
also be, according to a dynamic theory of existence, tendencies to evil.
The fact that a tendency is prevented from reaching its goal, good,
that the realization of good at which a tendency is directed is frustrated, can only be the result of a counter tendency. If the existence
of good is the result of a tendency, the existence of evil can also be
only the result of a tendency. For existence, as Wild emphatically
stresses, has an essentially tendential character. (Wild 65) Then there
cannot be-as the dynamic theory maintains-only tendencies to
good. The positive existence of evil which Wild has conceded cannot
be interpreted merely negatively-as "obstruction"-it must be posi-
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tively construed as the fulfilment of a tendency. Then there are two
opposing tendencies immanent in empirical reality: one directed at
good, one at evil.
Actually Wild distinguishes two kinds of tendencies: on the one
hand, "essential" or "natural" tendencies, which appear in human
nature as "indispensable needs" or "deliberate or voluntary desire
fused with practical reason," and on the other hand "dispensable,"
"emphemeral," or "raw" appetites. (Wild 68, 70) Essential tendencies
are those common to all human beings. The doctrine of natural law
assumes, says Wild, that men have certain traits in common which
are essential to the individual. "The theory of natural law . . . implies that human nature is an ordered set of traits possessed in
common by every human individual and essential to his being." (Wild
66) "Some tendencies are peculiar to the individual entity. But other
essential tendencies are shared in common by those possessing a
similar nature." (Wild 67) To be sure, Wild does not speak of unessential tendencies or tendencies contrary to nature. But if there
are "essential" tendencies, there must also be unessential ones. And,
if the necessary wants of human nature are tendencies, unnecessary
desires must also be tendencies, unessential tendencies, but still
tendencies. Wild designates these unnecessary desires also as "random
interests" and says that they are "antinatural": "Random interests which obstruct the full realization of essential common tendencies are condemned as antinatural. The maximizing of such
appetites is evil, not good." (Wild 69) But that means that besides
essentially natural tendencies directed at good, there must also be
unessential, antinatural tendencies directed at evil, at obstructing
the realization of the good. This is also apparent from the fact that
only essential tendencies may be construed as "norms or moral laws,"
(Wild 66) or as "natural rights." "Human existence is constituted
by diverse tendencies, some shared by every human individual and
indispensable to human life, others peculiar to certain individuals or
groups, and dispensable. The -latter are commonly called desires,
interests,or compulsions" [in another context appetites]. The former
are rightly distinguished as needs. They must be realized to some
degree if human life is to be lived at all-for example, the need for
food and the need for education. When clearly focused by rational
insight, they are called rights." (Wild 218) The dynamic doctrine of
natural law is based on this distinction between essential, i.e., natural,
and unessential, i.e., random, antinatural, tendencies. Wild admits
this, but speaks of "actions" rather than of "tendencies."
The pattern of action which is universally required for the living of
human life is essential. This is the standard of natural law. All other
acts are incidental. If they conflict with essential natural needs ["needs"
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are "tendencies"] they are evil. If they further the realization of such
matural needs in the concrete, they are good. If they do neither, they
;are indifferent. This is the theory. It evidently rests on the possibility
,of distinguishing between what is essential to an entity and what is
fincidental.... (Wild 77)

But how can an objective consideration of reality which does not
1presuppose value judgments distinguish between essential and un(essential tendencies (or actions) if they are equally existent? Wild's
answer is: essential and therefore natural is what is required for
lhuman life. But is life in general and human life in particular re,quired? Can one, from the facts of natural reality, conclude as a
norm that life in general and human life in particular ought to be
:preserved and promoted? On this norm is based the distinction between essential and unessential tendencies. Such a norm cannot be
,deduced, however, from the facts of natural reality. This is not only
because from the standpoint of an objective perception of reality
:human life takes no preference over non-human life, and tendencies
<irected at preserving and promoting life take no preference over
-tendencies directed at the destruction of life-for all tendencies are
-equally existent and "natural." It is rather because even if there
-were only tendencies directed at preservation and promotion of hu:nan life, or if opposing tendencies were only an exception-and this
.obviously cannot be so since all that lives must die, and the phenomenon of life, especially of human life, appears only in a minute part
'.of the natural reality known to us-even then one could still not
-conclude from this fact that life or only human life ought to be preserved and promoted and that therefore only what corresponds to
this norm is good and what contradicts it is evil. This norm is not
immanent in natural reality but is projected into it by the observer.
On this norm, and not on natural reality, the dynamic doctrine of
natural law is based. The doctrine is therefore-like all doctrines of
natural law-exactly the opposite of a realistic theory based only on
the observation of experienced facts.
It only ceases to be contradictory to disqualify tendencies in
natural reality as "contrary to nature" when one means by "nature"
not the objects of an observation directed at describing and explaining
reality-a causal order of actual occurrences-but a normative order
,of human conduct. Only the latter can be counteracted, not the
former. Only when a normative' interpretation takes the place of an
explicative interpretation can one mean by nature-as the dynamic
doctrine of natural law does-solely those tendencies directed at good.
This is only possible if one projects into reality the difference between good and evil, for one can not find this difference in the reality
available to empirical perception. Wild makes this projection when,
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in contradiction to his proclaimed principle of deducing all basic concepts of his theory from the observation of experienced facts, he
operates with a concept of "nature" which he differentiates from the
concept of being or existence-a concept that includes all experienced
facts. He says expressly that the doctrine of natural law does not
refer to all-encompassing being but to a "nature" which must be distinguished from this being. "The appeal is not made to being but to
nature. One cannot make a normative appeal to existence, which is
all-inclusive." (Wild 76) But a "normative appeal" is incompatible
with a theory which derives its basic concepts from experienced
facts. Such a theory can only determine what is, not what ought to
be. He continues: "But natural existence can be distinguished from
existence. Many things happen to a man, either from external influences, or from his own free choice, which are not in accordance
with his nature and his natural tendencies." (Wild 76) But the
tendencies that are the result of external influences, and in particular
the tendencies which are expressed in his own "free choice," are,
since they do actually exist, no less "natural" than those which Wild
would regard as the only "natural" ones. To prove the difference
between natural and antinatural tendencies as established in empirical
facts, he refers to the distinction between health and sickness: "If this
were not true, we could not distinguish between the healthy, or sound
state and that which is unhealthy and unsound." That which preserves life is healthy, that which destroys it is unhealthy. But disease
is just as natural a fact as health. It is only possible to identify the
healthy with the "natural" and the unhealthy with the antinatural
when the judgment that a living being is healthy or diseased includes a value judgment, when the norm is presupposed that living
beings ought to be healthy and not diseased, the norm that life ought
to be preserved and not destroyed, and when this norm is projected
into nature so that one can say that nature commands health and
prohibits disease. That means, however, that one shoves into the
place of nature as a system of causally connected facts the animistic
idea of a norm-setting nature endowed with will and power. Wild
does this when he admits that he uses the word "nature" to express
normative relations and in particular the "good" or "fitting" conditions of existential fulfillment. He says: "The word is used to express the general relation of fitness, and the dynamic entities ordered
into a world or cosmos by this normative relation ....
[T]he word is
often used to describe the good or fitting condition of existential
fulfillments." (Wild 108) The "nature" from which this "dynamic"
theory pretends to deduce the just order of human conduct is simply
the normative order itself which the theory presupposed.
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III. THE DYNAmiMc

NATURE OF EmPmIcIAL REALITY AS THE BASIS OF A
PLATONIC DocTRNE OF NATURAL LAW

Wild believes that he is able to demonstrate this dynamic doctrine
of natural law in the philosophy of Plato. He asserts: "Plato's ethics
is founded on the nature of man and the nature of things" (Wild 10)
"on strictly empirical grounds connected with the analysis of human
nature and its essential tendencies towards realization." (Wild 136)
But according to Plato not only the nature of man, but the nature of
everything existing in empirical reality is characterized by "an active
factor of dynamism or tendency which urges it towards further
existence not yet acquired." (Wild 137) This means that Plato deduces the norms which prescribe the good in general and the just
conduct of men in particular from nature as empirical reality perceptible to the senses; which in turn means that Plato regards this reality
as essentially good, since, if norms may be deduced from reality at
all, only a good reality can be the basis of a natural law. Wild says

himself of a realistic ethics: "Such an ethics must hold that existence
is radically good." (Wild 151)
This attempt to demonstrate a Platonic doctrine of natural law
founded on the perception of empirical reality is doomed from the
start because of the negative attitude which Plato takes towards this
empirical reality. 6 According to his doctrine of ideas the particular
things which are perceptible to the senses, which are in a state of
becoming, and which arise and pass away are merely images or
shadows of ideas. "Ideas are; as it were, patterns fixed in nature,
(& - c4v'ar) and other things are like them, and resemblances of them
-what is meant by the participation of other things in the ideas, is
really assimilation to them." (Parmenides 132) In this sentence
"nature" ((4pn) cannot mean empirical reality. The things of empirical reality, however, are but objects of mere opinion, not of
genuine knowledge. True knowledge of constantly changing empirical
reality is completely impossible. In Cratylus 439-40 Plato says through
Socrates: "Then how can that be a real thing which is never in the
same shape? . . . nor yet can they be known by any one; for at

the moment the observer approaches them they become other and
of another nature so that you cannot get any further in knowing
their nature or state, for you cannot know that which has no state."
These constantly changing things of empirical reality are therefore
assigned no real being. This can only be sought in the realm of
ideas, which transcendental, removed from all arising and passing, is
accessible to the only genuine knowledge. "And the soul is like the
6. See Reino Palas, Die Bewertung der Sinnenwelt bei Platon, 48 ANNALES
ACADEmiAE SCdTIAERIm FENNicAE 2 (1941) (see notably the section beginning at 204).
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eye," we read in the Republic 508, "when resting upon that on which
truth and being shine,"-that is, ideas--"the soul perceives and
understands and is radiant with intelligence; but when turned towards
the twilight of becoming and perishing, then she has opinion only,
and goes blinking about, and is first of one opinion and then of another, and seems to have no intelligence." That which is only an
image is not something truly existent; it is in a certain sense nonexistent. (Sophist 240) Only the truly existent "must be placed in
the class of the good;" that which is becoming and only exists for
the sake of being "must... be placed in some other class." (Philebus
54) Empirical reality, which is perpetual becoming, arising and passing, is therefore not only not truly existent, but also not good, even
perhaps evil. How could norms for just human conduct be derived
from such an empirical reality?
As proof that tendencies to completion are, according to Plato,
immanent in empirical reality, Wild cites various passages from the
Platonic dialogues, most of which furnish no proof. Thus he quotes
Phaedrus 270: "Ought we not to consider first whether that which we
wish to learn and to teach is a simple or multiform thing, and if
simple, then to inquire what power it has of acting or being acted
upon in relation to other things." But there is nothing to indicate
that this "power" (Uivauts) is a tendency to completion. From there
he proceeds to Timaeus 62: "But things which are contracted contrary to nature are by nature (KaTa p'at) at war, and force themselves apart." But this assertion pertains to a purely physiological
phenomenon. It occurs in the course of a completely value-free explanation of the sense impression of cold. "And to this war and
convulsion," the passage continues, "the name of shivering and
trembling is given; and the whole affection and the cause of the affection are both termed cold." There is no mention of a tendency to
completion. Neither is there in the Republic 433 where justice demands "that one should practice one thing only, the thing to which
his nature was best adapted." The fact, often emphasized in this
dialogue, that only few are called to govern because most men are
not fitted to by nature, in no way leads to the conclusion that Plato
believed that a tendency to perfection was immanent in human nature. Least of all Cratylus 393, where Plato finds it "contrary to
nature" that a horse should give birth to a calf. Wild concludes from
this that Plato assumes "subrational tendencies" as immanent in empirical reality. He presents as Plato's doctrine: "Since the world is not
a chaos, subrational tendencies are fulfilled for the most part, though
there are always exceptions. Plato sometimes uses the word nature
to refer to those regular sequences determined by recurrent tendencies. Thus monstrous births are not natural, but that a horse should
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generate a horse is according to nature." (Wild 142) But from the
passage quoted it follows only that Plato characterizes "regular sequences" as natural, not that he views these "regular sequences" as
determined by tendencies.
Only one passage cited by Wild seems to indicate that Plato assumes
tendencies in the things of empirical reality in the sense of Wild's
doctrine of natural rights. It is Phaedo 75. Here, says Wild, the
thought is expressed that ideas, like equality and justice, are never
quite present in concrete things but have the tendency to approach
their prototypes as far as possible and thus to perfect themselves:
"Pure forms such as equality and justice are never wholly present
in the concrete beings which only partake of them. Nevertheless, the
forms are somehow partially present in their imitations, seeking and
tending to perfect themselves so far as possible." (Wild 142) In the
passage to which Wild refers the question is treated: how is it possible for one to recognize two things in empirical reality as equal.
Socrates emphasizes that no two concrete things are ever completely
equal; their empirically ascertainable equality falls short of absolute
equality, the idea of equality. "From the senses then is derived the
knowledge that all sensible things aim at an absolute equality of
which they fall short." It is hardly admissible to assume-as Wild
does-that it may therefore be stated as a general principle of the
doctrine of ideas that all empirical things have the immanent tendency
to resemble their prototypes, ideas. In Parmenides130 Plato expressly
denies the existence of ideas of certain material things such as "hair,
mud, dirt, or anything else which is vile and paltry." Of these things
Socrates says here: "Visible things like these are such as they appear to us." Moreover, in Plato's doctrine of ideas there is no idea
of evil, although-as we will see later-he assigns evil to empirical
reality. But even if one puts aside these considerations one cannot
view the passage from the Phaedo as proof of a realistic Platonic
doctrine of natural law founded on the tendential character of empirical reality, that is, only on observed facts. For the assumption of
the tendencies under consideration here is based not on the observation of facts but on metaphysical speculation. The ideas which empirical things strive to approach are beyond empirical reality and
cannot at all be recognized by man, who exists in empirical reality.
Only the soul, loosed from the body, is able to see them. If we hold
two things in empirical reality to be equal, we do so because our soul
has seen the idea of equality before its union with the body, that is,
before our birth, and has remembered it after birth. "Then we must
have acquired the knowledge of equality at some previous time ...
before we began to see or hear or perceive in any way, we must have
had a knowledge of absolute equality ... then we also knew before
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we were born and at the instant of birth not only the equal or the
greater or the less, but all other ideas." The thesis that the cognition
of empirical reality-so far as this is possible-is based on recollection of what the soul has seen in its pre-existence and will see in its
post-existence, is an important link in the proof of the immortality
of the soul with which the dialogue Phaedo essentially deals. The
tendencies of the images to perfect themselves by approaching their
prototypes are quite the opposite of empirically observed facts; and a
doctrine of law based on these tendencies is no doctrine of natural
law in the sense of Wild's definition of this concept. For "nature" in
this doctrine is not empirical reality but the world of ideas which
transcends this reality. Actually Plato uses the word ovltu (nature) although not exclusively-to mean the expression of the true being
of ideas, which coincides for him with the absolute "Ought." Thus
in Phaedo 103 he opposes the world of ideas--r & 7 040iet-to the
world of empirical reality---r & j/Zv; in the Republic 597 he speaks
of the idea as something present &T nj VIoCL; and in Phaedrus 254 he
characterizes the idea of beauty as 7-0c Ka'XOv0 01 ts.7 In Cratylus
389 it is explained that an artificially produced object (the example
given is a shuttle made by a carpenter) is best made when it is
fashioned after the idea of the object, when the artisan is guided by
the idea of what he wishes to make. Then the form of what he is
creating is in accordance with nature (04=3). This is asserted in
answer to the question, "And how does the legislator make names?
and to what does he look?" The legislator will have to be guided
by ideas if he is to govern the conduct of men "according to nature."
IV. PLATO'S DOCTRINE OF GOOD AND EvIL IN THE NATURE OF EMPIRcAL
REALITY
If a theory of law pretends to deduce the just norms of human
conduct from empirical reality, it must, as we have already emphasized, presuppose that this reality is essentially good and if it must
concede the existence of evil, it can only be an exception, an abnormality, or, as in the dynamic doctrine of natural law, a mere
frustration of tendencies to good which are immanent in empirical
reality. From this standpoint too Platonic ethics is the exact opposite
of a doctrine of natural law founded on empirical reality.
To show that according to Plato nature is the proper order of
original tendencies directed at good, Wild refers (Wild 143) to Laws
903. In this passage Plato seeks to prove that the gods not only exist
but care for human affairs as well. The Athenian says: "Let us
say to the youth" (who doubts):--"The ruler of the universe has
7. See also Parmenides132.
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ordered all things with a view to the excellence and preservation of
the whole, and each part has an appointed state of action and passion
[meaning a state of enduring pain]." The fact that things behave in
accordance with divine order which aims at the perfection of the
entire universe must by no means be interpreted as a tendency
immanent in things to this behavior. It is hardly possible to assume
that things, especially human beings, have the original "tendency" to
endure pain. For it follows, as we shall see, that by "passion" is
meant the divine punishment which awaits those who do not act in
accordance with the divine order directed at the good. The Athenian
continues: "Now, as the soul combining first with one body and then
with another undergoes all sorts of changes, either of herself, or
through the influence of another soul, [that is, a bad soul; Laws 904]
all that remains to the player of the game is that he should shift the
pieces; sending the better nature to the better place, and the worst
to the worst, and so assigning to them their proper portion." The
"proper portion" is the reward granted by the gods to the good and
the punishment of the gods which threatens the evil, particularly the
punishments in Hades.
This passage proves that, if according to Plato there are such things
as incipient tendencies, there must be tendencies to evil as well as
to good, that the evil is not less existent and hence not less "natural"
than the good, and that the order of nature which Plato has in mind
is a divine, transcendental order, not one which is empirically ascertainable.
For his assertion that according to Plato incipient tendencies can
be weak or misled and not reach their fulfillment, that the evil is
non-existence because destruction, Wild cites Laws 906 (Wild 144,
146). In this passage we read: "For as we acknowledge the world to
be full of many goods and also of evils, and of more evils than goods,
there is, as we affirm, an immortal conflict going on among us, which
requires marvellous watchfulness; and in that conflict the gods and
demigods are our allies, and we are their property. Injustice and
insolence and folly are the destruction of us, and justice and temperance and wisdom are our salvation." The view is then rejected that
the gods are prepared to pardon unjust and wicked men. "Injustice
and insolence ... are the destruction of us" means that the evil which
we do is punished mercilessly by the gods. The gods fix their punishments partly in this world, but mainly in the world beyond, in Hades
(Laws 905). If good and evil are represented as two equal powers
at war with one another, then evil must indeed be quite existent in
empirical reality. The divine order of the world, which is essentially
an order of punishment and which thereby helps the good to victory
over the evil, would be senseless otherwise.
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Wild believes that he is also able to find in the Republic 352 the
doctrine that evil in empirical reality has only a so-to-speak negative
existence, that it is only obstruction or frustration of tendencies immanent in empirical -reality and directed at good. (Wild 146) This
is the passage where-according to Wild-Plato teaches that injustice
brings man into conflict with himself and makes it "impossible for
him to do anything." Socrates does in fact say: "And is not injustice
equally fatal when existing in a single person; in the first place rendering him incapable of action because he is not at unity with himself,
and in the second place making him an enemy to himself and the
just?" But this assertion is preceded by an explanation that a group
of individuals-a state or band of robbers-which is not unified cannot
accomplish anything as a group and that their disunity is brought on
by their unjust conduct with one another." And this is because injustice creates divisions and hatreds and fighting, and justice imparts
harmony and friendship." (Republic 351) After the passage cited
above by Wild, Socrates asserts as "the remainder of my report"
that "the unjust are incapable of common action." "Common" means
as a community, because dissent rends the community. But in their
mutual relations the unjust are quite capable of action since it is in
their actions that "divisions," "hatred," and "fighting" are expressed,
the results of their injustice. Evil, or injustice, appears just as positive a factor as justice. And its effects within a community are
conspicuous. The effect of justice and injustice on the individual is
not the essential thing here. If "the unjust are incapable of action"
were taken literally there would be no unjust action. The sentence
means that injustice makes men incapable of acting correctly or
justly. Just as according to Plato man can only "will" the good, so he
can only "act" justly. Just as "will" means to will what one ought to
will, "to act" means to act as one ought to act. It is this representation of the "ought" as the "is" that is so characteristic of Plato's
ethical speculation. When Plato says of the unjust man that "he is
in discord and disunity with himself," he says so only to make clear
the analogy between the unjust society and the unjust individual.
This "disunity" in the unjust man does not mean, however, a conflict
between good and evil tendencies in the individual. It means the conflict between the real nature of a man, who is unjust, and the ideal
nature, according to which he ought to be just. Socrates later concedes that a community of men who are only "half-villains in their
enterprises," who have something of justice yet about them, can
still accomplish something, since they are not completely disunited;
that only the utterly unjust are utterly incapable of action. The
"utterly unjust" are those in whom there is no conflict at all between
justice and injustice and who therefore are not at variance with
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themselves. Try as one may, he cannot conclude from this that evil,
i.e., injustice, is merely a check on the tendencies toward good, i.e.,
justice, which reside in man.
Wild further attempts to prove that the evil in Plato's philosophy
is only characterized negatively as a frustration or destruction of the
positively existent good by saying that for Plato the good, in particular the just, is the health of the soul and evil or injustice the
sickness. This identification of good and healthy, and evil and sick
is of decisive importance for Wild's doctrine of natural law because
with it he believes he is able to answer the question of how one
recognizes good and evil, i.e., value, in empirical reality. The answer
is: just as one recognizes health and sickness in a living being. We
have already shown that this is no answer to the question. We shall
now see if Plato's philosophy confirms Wild's error.
Wild refers (Wild 146) to Gorgias 477 where in fact justice is
related to health, and injustice to sickness. Plato presents justice
as a sort of health and injustice as a sort of sickness in still other
places: for example, the Republic 410, 490, Phaedo 69. But in all
these passages it is a matter of little more than a comparison. Alcibiades I explains it. There the difference is stressed between justice
and injustice on the one hand and health and sickness on the other.
Socrates calls to Alcibiades' attention: "I do not suppose that you
ever saw or heard of men quarrelling over the principles of health
and disease to such an extent as to go to war and kill one another for
the sake of them? ... But of the quarrels about justice and injustice

.." (Alcibiades I 112). The dialogue proceeds to the thesis that to
perceive what is good and just, bad and unjust one must not look to
the body, as in the question of health and sickness, but to the soul,
which is our divine part. One must "look only at what is bright and
divine, and act with a view to them." "In that mirror you (Alcibiades
and the state) will see and know yourselves and your own good,"
(Alcibiades I 134) that is, justice. And since the question is raised,
how. can Alcibiades escape from his present condition, one of injustice, and Alcibiades answers: "By your help, Socrates," Socrates
replies: "That is not well said, Alcibiades." To Alcibiades' question:
"What ought I to have said?" Socrates answers: "By the help of God"
(Alcibiades 1 135) Justice is to be sought in Him, not in the physical
world of empirical reality.
Wild also refers (Wild 155) to the passage beginning at Republic
443., Here Socrates says that justice and injustice "are like disease and
health; being in the soul just what disease and health are in the
body." "Then virtue is the health and beauty and well-being of the
soul, and vice the disease and weakness and deformity of the same."
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Here there seems to be more than a mere comparison of justice and
health, injustice and sickness; there seems to be an identity. But
how does Plato arrive at this identity? Does he define the concepts
"health" and "sickness" as facts of empirical reality which can be
established by value-free biological or psychological observation? That
is the decisive question if a real doctrine of natural law based on
the observation of facts is to be found in Plato. The health of the
soul-virtue or justice-has a certain mutual relation, according to
the passage quoted, to the three parts of the soul: the soul is healthy
when reason with the help of spirit controls desire. This is "natural"
since it is the task of the rational faculty to rule. (Republic 441)
The soul is sick when this relation is reversed. "The creation of
health is the institution of a natural order and government of one
by another in the parts of the body; and the creation of disease is
the production of a state of things at variance with this natural
order." (Republic 444) No one will seriously maintain that this is
the result of physiological or biological observation of empirical
nature. The thesis of the control of desire by reason is an ethicalpolitical postulate set up to justify the rule of philosophers over the
mass of working people. The "nature" with which the rule of reasor
over desire accords cannot possibly be the nature of empirical reality
since here the "anti-natural" rule of desire over reason is in Plato's.
own view more frequent than the "natural" rule of reason over desire. The assertion that the rule of reason over desire will effect just
action cannot refer to empirical reason for even highly unjust actions
can be the result of reasoned, unimpassioned consideration. It is the
divine reason, the reason commanding the good, which is meant here,.
the reason which prevails in the ideal state, the reason of philosophers
who have perceived the idea of the good. That reason ought to rule
in man means nothing else than that the good ought to rule. And
that the man ruled by reason is just is only the metaphorically disguised tautology that good is just or that just is good. To say that
the rule of reason is healthy means nothing more than that this rule
is just or good. It is obvious that the quite vague remark about the
health of the body-the natural "rule" of certain parts of the
body not closely defined over other parts likewise not closely defined-has nothing to do with biology. This "health" too is an ethicalpolitical construction which serves to justify the rule of philosophers.
It is constructed on the model of the "health of the soul" just as the
health of the soul is constructed on the model of the health of the
ideal state, that is, according to a condition viewed as just, and not
the other way around.
Moreover, the Platonic equation of health and justice, sickness and
injustice fails at the point decisive for Wild's doctrine of natural
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law: the assertion that one can establish the good or justice and
the evil or injustice through the simple observation of facts, just as
health and disease. After his assertion that justice is a sort of
health and injustice a sort of disease, Socrates says one must still
investigate "which is the more profitable, to be just and act justly
;and practice virtue, whether seen or unseen of gods and men, or to
be unjust and act unjustly ..... " Socrates thus assumes the possibility
that justice in a man may remain unrecognized-in view of the
transcendental nature of justice this is quite possible. He is therefore
:far from maintaining that one can ascertain justice and injustice
.just as one can ascertain health and disease in a living organism. To
this question of Socrates Plato answers through Glaucon that it is
ridiculous to doubt that it is useful to be just and act justly. "We
think that, when the bodily constitution is gone, we are no longer
-capable of living, or, what amounts to the same: life is no longer
-endurable (ob fluTv dva), though pampered with all kinds of meats

.and drinks, and having all wealth and all power; and shall we be
told that when the very essence of the vital principle (the soul) is
,undermined and corrupted, life is still worth having to a man (flt(or0V
,apL graL), if only he be allowed to do whatever he likes with the

single exception that he is not to acquire justice and virtue, or to
-escape from injustice and vice ..

. .'" The

thought here suggested is

that injustice of the soul is not a disease in the same sense as a
,disease of the body. For life is biologically impaired by physical
-disease, even destroyed; by injustice it stops being morally worth
living. But the unjust man's soul is quite alive even though this
.lie is no longer valuable from the point of view of a moral order
.assumed to be valid. The word fltwro'g is used quite appropriately
in both cases: it is translated once "life is . . .endurable" and once

"'life is worth having." It has both meanings: a biological and an
ethical one.
To demonstrate a Platonic doctrine of natural law based on empiri-cal reality, Wild also cites Laws 892, where the essence and working
,of the soul is discussed. (Wild 138-39) Plato asserts through the
Athenian that, in contrast to the view of the materialists, the soul
originated before the body: "She is among the first of things, and
before all bodies.., then in the truest sense and beyond other things
k4e). The
the soul may be said to exist by nature" (rivaL Stacp4omv
Athenian also says: "The soul is prior to the body; . . . the body

is second and comes afterwards, and has, according to nature (Vwrau
aicnv) to obey the soul, [Jowett translates "is born to obey the soul"]
which is the ruler." This means that the soul is the "first origin and
moving power of all that is and ... the source of change and motion

in all things." (Laws 896) The order of nature according to which
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the soul originated before the body and is therefore the source of
all change is consequently a causal order. But the priority of the
soul over the body is only stressed as a basis for maintaining the
existence of the gods; and the belief in the gods is the main ideological instrument in the legislation of the state, with which the dialogue
is concerned. "In the next place, must we not of necessity admit that
the soul is the cause of good and evil, base and honorable, just and
unjust, and of all other opposites, if we suppose her to be the cause
of all things?" Here we see more plainly that the order of nature
according to which the soul is the source of everything, especially
of all motion and change, is thought to be a causal and not a moral
order. As a moral order only the good could be traced to it and only
the good be viewed as according to nature. But on this point Plato
shifts, in the person of the Athenian, from a causal to a normative
manner of viewing. He attempts to interpret the causal order of
nature as a moral order as well. He ends in the same situation as
Christian theology which seeks to conceive of God as the ultimate
cause of all occurrence and at the same time as the highest moral
authority, the absolute good, and the personification of the moral
world order which ordains good. This leads to the problem of
theodicy. How can God, who wills good, cause evil? Christian theology attempts to escape the contradiction by assuming an anti-God,
Satan. God is the cause only of good; the cause of evil is the God's
foe, the anti-God. Plato proceeds in the same way. After he has
established that the soul, which according to the order of nature is
the origin of everything and thus plays the role of God, he must
regard this God as the source of good and evil. Thus he gets into the
same difficulty as the Christian theology. Since he wishes to portray
God as prima causa, the ultimate cause, he must allow God to be the
source of evil as well as of good, thus depriving him of the essential
function for which he had introduced him into the legislation of the
state: the function of the highest moral authority. Therefore he
cannot assume one soul, but must assume two: one, the source of
good, and one, the source of evil. The Athenian says: "And as the
soul orders and inhabits all things that move, however moving, must
we not say that she orders also the heavens?" Cleinias answers: "Of
course." The Athenian asks: "One or more?" Quite characteristically
he does not wait for Cleinias' reply, but gives it himself: "More than
one-I will answer for you; at any rate, we must not suppose that
there are less than two-one the author of good, and the other of
evil." To this Cleinias answers: "Very true."
The doctrine of the two world souls, one good and one evil, has
caused trouble for the apologetic Platonic interpretation, since it contradicts the other doctrine of Plato according to which the soul
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represents good and the body evil. Various attempts have therefore
been made to interpret it away. But these attempts are all the more
hopeless-as we have seen-since the two-soul doctrine is the inevitable consequence of the Platonic and the Christian theological attempt to comprehend nature at once as a causal and a normative
order.
In the construction of an evil soul which causes evil in the world
there is clearly expressed the assumption of a real existence of evil
in the world of experience, that is, in the world of nature determined
by causal law. No natural law can be based on this nature.
After the necessity for assuming two world souls has been proved,
the world soul is characterized: she is "herself a goddess, when
truly receiving the divine mind she disciplines all things rightly to
their happiness; but when she is the companion of folly, she does
the very contrary of this." (Laws 897)
The next step is to establish that of the two souls only the good
soul led by divine reason can be regarded as the guide of heaven and
earth and the entire surrounding universe-insofar as the path of
heavenly bodies is complete. "But if the world moves wildly and
irregularly"-a possibility which does not seem ruled out-"then the
evil soul guides it." (Laws 897) Later a number of good world souls
appear in the place of the one, evidently to make this soul theology
accord with the polytheistic popular religion of the Greeks. The
Athenian explains in summary that the visible revolution of the
heavenly bodies takes place through the care and guidance of the
best soul. Thereupon Cleinias says: ". . there would be impiety in
asserting that any but the most perfect soul or souls carries around
the heavens." (Laws 898) One must therefore assume that all stars
are set in motion by good souls. And now the Athenian draws the
conclusion at which this speculation has been directed. "Since a
soul or souls having every sort of excellence are the causes of all of
them, those souls are gods, whether they are living beings and reside
in bodies, and in this way order the whole heaven, or whatever be
the place and mode of their existence;-and will anyone who admits
all this venture to deny that all things are full of gods?" (Laws 899)
If this is the basis of a theory of law it can only be a radically
theological, metaphysical theory, not a realistic one based on empirical
reality. One can concur with Wild's assertion that Plato, Aristotle,
and their Greek and Arab successors developed their theories of law
with no reference to Christian revelation. But Plato's theology is not
very different from Christian theology, and certainly influenced it.
Plato's doctrine of law is founded on pure theology and not, as Wild
insists, "on strictly empirical grounds connected with the analysis
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of human nature and its essential tendencies towards realization."
(Wild 136)
V. PLATO'S DOCTRINE OF GOOD AND EviL IN THE NATURE OF MAN

If a natural law applicable to all men is to be founded on the actual
nature of man and deduced from this nature, then there must be
in empirical reality a uniform nature of man-all men must be alike
-and the common nature of men must be good-men must be actually
good or at least want the good. Expressed in the language of the
dynamic doctrine of natural law, a tendency to the good but no
tendency to the evil must be immanent in the common nature of man.
Wild maintains that this is Plato's view of the nature, of man and
that this anthropology is at the bottom of the Platonic doctrine of
natural law.
For Plato, he says (Wild 18), "human nature is one." "He certainly
believed in the moral unity of man. This is proved ... by countless
passages which may be quoted from his discussions of the human soul
and of wisdom and virtue, which are the same everywhere for all
men." (Wild 30) That is to say not only wisdom and virtue-the
moral order-but also the.souls of men which the moral order addresses are the same. Wild emphasizes: "Plato conceived of the good
for man as the realization of human nature in all its phases under
the guidance of reason which alone deserves to rule. His ethics is
based upon his anthropology." (Wild 31) By the nature of man Plato
means "those traits and tendencies which all men share in common."
(Wild 38) "In Plato's opinion such rules must be founded on, and
derived from the actual nature, factually found in man." (Wild 15)
It is obvious that such a theory of human nature contradicts reality,
since the nature of men is quite different when judged morallythere are good and evil, reasonable and unreasonable men, saints and
criminals-and that if the suppositions of a doctrine of natural law
based on the like, good-seeking nature of all men were met, all legal
order would be superfluous. The natural law doctrine of the equality
of men pertains not to the real but to the ideal nature of men. The
thesis that all men are alike, in the typical mixing of the "is" and
the "ought," means only that all men ought to be treated alike, i.e.,
well, although they are actually not alike. One cannot deduce a
natural law from the ideal nature of man because this nature is the
natural law itself or the natural law projected into real nature.
However, all these arguments do not come into question in this
connection. Here we should see only if we can find in Plato the
anthropology on which Wild bases his Platonic doctrine of.natural
law. First those passages from Plato which Wild cites as proof that
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Plato bases his doctrine of natural law on the nature common to all
men, on essential common tendencies. In Timaeus 69 Plato says all
souls were created according to a formula. But this passage speaks
decidely against a uniform nature of men which tends to good. For
here it says that the immortal beings-the gods, created by the divine
maker-created the mortal beings, men, by placing immortal soulsubstance left them by the creator into mortal bodies. Man therefore
is composed of a mortal body and an immortal soul. Furthermore the
gods gave man, in addition to his immortal soul, a second, mortal
soul. "They... constructed within the body a soul of another nature
which was mortal, subject to terrible and irresistible affections,first of all pleasure, the greatest incitement to evil; then, pain, which
deters from good; also rashness and fear, two foolish counsellors,
anger hard to be appeased, and hope easily led astray;-these they
mingled with irrational sense and with all-daring love according to
necessary laws, and so framed man." It clearly follows that both
good and evil tendencies are essential to the nature of man. Moreover, according to Plato the relation between the immortal soul
directed at good and the mortal soul directed at evil is quite different
within different individuals; there are men led by reason and inclined
to good and men determined by "irrational sense" and inclined to
evil. Therefore the actual natures of man are very different. Only
the immortal soul-substance which the divine creator has left the gods
for making man is uniform. But this is obviously only the good substantialized in this mythical presentation, the moral norm presupposed
by Plato and projected on the real nature of man, the ideal nature
of man. Wild refers further to the Statesman 268-74 where Plato
compares the art of governing with the art of raising cattle, and the
relation between the ruler, who alone possesses the art of the statesman, and the ruled, who do not share this art, with the relation of a
shepherd to his flock. But this dialogue in particular shows Plato's
view of the radical difference in human nature. In this comparison
there is enunciated the essential contrast between the nature of the
man whose lot is to rule and the nature of men whose lot is to be
ruled. Rule should fall to him who according to his nature is able
to acquire the "science of government" (Statesman 292), the "royal
science" (Statesman 259), the royal art of ruling. Only a few have
this capability. "'Do you think that the multitude in a State can
attain political Science?' 'Impossible.'" (Statesman 292) "For we do
not appoint oxen to be the lords of oxen, or goats of goats; but we
ourselves are a superior race and rule over them." (Laws 713) The
difference between the nature of the true ruler and those men who
are subject by their natures to be ruled is as great as that between
shepherd and herd, between man and animal. Therefore absolute
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monarchy is the best form of government, and democracy the worst.
The true ruler differs in his nature not only from the mass of men
ruled. There is also an essential difference between the nature of the
genuine ruler, the king, and that of a tyrant. One ought not to group
king and tyrant in the same class for they are "utterly distinct, like
their modes of government." (Statesman 276)
The view of the essential difference in human nature appears especially clearly in Plato's presentation of the goals of the royal science
of government. "Those who have no share of manliness and temperance, or any other virtuous inclination, and, from the necessity of
an evil nature, are violently carried away to godlessness and insolence and injustice, she gets rid of by death and exile, and punishes
them with the greatest of disgraces .... But those who are wallowing
in ignorance and baseness she bows under the yoke of slavery."
(Statesman 308-09) Unjust conduct corresponds to the nature of men
who so conduct themselves, and slavery is justified when it answers
the inferior nature of men placed in this condition. These bad natures
stand opposed to "the rest of the citizens, out of whom, if they have
education, something noble may be made." The true art of government should employ these latter in a way appropriate to their nature
and beneficial to the state. In so doing it must form a durable union
of "those whose natures tend rather to courage" and "those who incline to order and gentleness." But "Can we say that such a connection as will lastingly unite the evil with one another or with the good,
or that any science would seriously think of using a bond of this kind
to join such materials? Impossible." (Statesman 309) A uniform
human nature is out of the question.
Plato's view that men are not alike but very essentially different
in their actual nature is the basis of his political theory, which aims
at an apology for autocracy and a passionate rejection of democracy.
This is even clearer in the Republic than in the Statesman. Here he
says (Republic 428) that the ideal state in which a small minority
rules a majority completely without political rights is erected "according to nature" (xarm ¢ 4Pnv). The "nature" which he means is
the actual nature of man. Of this nature he declares, "I am myself
reminded that we are not all alike; there are diversities of nature
among us which are adapted to different occupations" (Republic
370).. From this assumption Plato arrives at the principle "that one
man should practice one thing only, the thing to which his nature
(4naLm) was best adapted" (Republic 433). This justifies the demand
that in the ideal state government be reserved for a few philosophers
to the exclusion of the mass of people. For only a few possess a
philosophical nature, and the nature of most men renders them
incapable of learning philosophy. Plato therefore stresses most em-
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phatically the difference between "philosophical nature and nonphilosophical nature" (xpt'vw Lc'XXT 4PvlV 0xao0fv e Ka I) (Republic 485). He maintains that "there will be discovered to be some
natures who ought to study philosophy and to be leaders in the State;
and others who are not born to be philosophers, and are meant to be
followers rather than leaders" (Republic 474). "For the multitude
[Jowett: the "world"] cannot possibly be a philosopher" (Republic
494). The ideal state must therefore be exactly the opposite of a
democracy, which is founded on the false assumption that men are
alike in their real nature.
The fact that men are not alike-that there is no uniform human
nature-is the explanation for Plato of good and evil men. He traces
to their nature-or to what is often the same in Plato,8 to their soul
-conduct which is to be judged good as well as that which is to be
judged evil. "For all, good and evil, whether in the body or in human
nature, originates . . . in the soul, and overflows from thence."
(Charmides 156) In Laws 655 there is a discussion of certain choral
dances which express vice. Only those men will find pleasure in
them whose nature corresponds to such a portrayal, whereas those
whose natures oppose the dances will condemn them. The difference
between good and evil natural inclinations is unmistakable. Time and
again there is in Plato a question of men who in their nature are
good, just, and reasonable, and of those who in their nature are evil,
unjust, and unreasonable. (See, e.g., Laws 900, 931-32.) In Laws 710
the Athenian speaks of "the natural gift of children and animals, of
whom some live continently and others incontinently." And Laws
766: "Man, as we say, is a tame or civilized animal; nevertheless he
requires proper instruction and a fortunate nature, and then of all
animals he becomes the most divine and most civilized; but if he be
insufficiently or ill educated he is the most savage of earthly creatures." Here a distinction is made between a fortunate and unfortunate nature ((prLm), although the power is not attributed to it
alone to withhold man from evil-in addition, he must have proper
instruction to enter on a good life. Therefore the legislator must
regulate the education of youth and not allow it "to become a secondary or accidental matter." The myth which aims to justify the
division of the ideal state into three classes (Republic 415) is quite
characteristic of Plato's view of the nature of men. The basic thought
is that every man would be grouped in the class appropriate to his
nature. The myth expresses it: "God has framed you differently.
8. In The Republic 576, for instance, the "soul" of the tyrant is synonymous
with the "nature" of the tyrant (rvpavvu 04M) and in The Republic (454)
we read "that a physician and one who is in mind a physician (Iacrpudv 7rjv
OA;,) may be said to have the same nature (r v &v7-flv

0'aatv).
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Some of you have the power of command, and in the composition of
these he has mingled gold, wherefore also they have the greatest
honor; others he has made of silver, to be auxiliaries; others again
who are to be husbandman and craftsman he has composed of brass
and iron." To be sure, "a golden parent will sometimes have a silver
son, or a silver parent a golden son." But God commands the rulers
above all things to "watch over their offspring and see what elements
mingle in their souls [Jowett: "in their nature"] for if the son of a
golden or silver parent has an admixture of brass and iron, then
nature orders a transposition of ranks, and the eye of the ruler must
not be pitiful towards the child because he has to descend in the scale
and become a husbandman or artisan ...." Only because the natures
of men differ as radically as do gold, silver, and iron is the division
into classes justified. There is no such thing for Plato as a like nature
for all men from which a law, alike for all men at all times, can be
deduced. The three classes of the ideal state correspond to the three
parts of the soul: the reasonable, the passionate, and the desirous.
(Republic 439-41) The relation of these three parts to one another is
the actual nature of man. Since this relation is different in different
men, the nature of man in different individuals is quite different. The
proper relation exists when the reasonable part rules the desirous with
the aid of the passionate. When Plato characterizes the rule of reason
as "according to nature" (Republic 444), he means the ideal, not the
real nature of man; and this ideal nature is nothing else but the
moral norm which he has presupposed as applicable to all men but
which he has not deduced from the real nature of man.
Wild believes he is able to conclude from the Republic 353 that
Plato bases the norms of natural law on the nature of the soul of
man. Plato teaches here that the nature of the human soul is expressed in its specific function, and that this natural function is
virtue and moral conduct. But in this passage Plato says only that
each thing has a specific function, and performs it well or poorly; and
the correct performance of a thing he calls "virtue" (&pe4). The
specific function of the human soul is "to superintend and command
and deliberate and the like." And "then an evil soul must necessarily
be an evil ruler and superintendent, and the good soul a good ruler."
The soul rules well when it rules justly. Justice is the virtue of the
soul, injustice its defect. "Then the just soul and the just man will
live well, and the unjust man will live ill." (Republic 353) It does
not follow from this passage that virtue is the nature of the soul
and moral conduct the natural function of man. There are good,
virtuous souls and evil, virtueless souls just as there are just and
unjust men. A soul has virtue if its condition is such as it ought to be
according to the presupposed moral order, that is, if it is just. Virtue
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is justice, and the real nature of man is not necessarily just.
In his judgment of the real nature of man Plato is quite pessimistic.
When in Laws 854 the Athenian mentions the crime of robbing
temples, he expresses his concern at the "weakness of human nature
generally"; he speaks of "incurable or almost incurable criminals"; and
stresses that, when men turn to robbing temples, it is a "tormenting
drive," which has developed in them. Plato is clearly not of the
opinion that "original tendencies" of men are aimed only at good. In
another context (Laws 691) the Athenian says that there is no
man whose soul is of such nature (t
0natq) that he, "young and
irresponsible,... will be able to sustain the temptation of arbitrary
power-no one who will not, under such circumstances, become filled
with folly, that worst of diseases. . . ." Somewhat later he says
(Laws 713) "that no human nature invested with supreme power
is able to order human affairs and not overflow with insolence and
wrong." "Mankind must have laws, and conform to them, or their
life would be as bad as that of the most savage beast. And the reason
is that no man's nature (0atos vpJrwv ob8EV49) is able to know what is
best for human society; or knowing, always able and willing to do
what is best .... If a man were born so divinely gifted that he could
naturally (041€) apprehend the truth, he would have no need of
laws to rule over him .... But there is no such mind anywhere, or
at least not much; and therefore we must choose law and order, which
are second best." (Laws 874-75) Here Plato says most explicitly
that if man's nature were essentially good-or, as Wild would put it,
if the tendencies common to all men and essential to their nature
were aimed at the good-then every law, and especially a natural
law would be superfluous.
To recognize the true nature of man, Wild says, one must observe
individuals "who have pushed their capacities to the very breaking
point." (Wild 148) We must penetrate appearances "to what is
really there in nature." It is hard to understand how one can conclude in this fashion that the good is the realization of actual human
nature. For a man who has pushed his capacities to the breaking
point can as easily be a criminal as a saint. The nature realized in
him can as easily be evil as good. Here Wild cites among other
passages the Republic 611. But this passage, which deals with the
soul as the nature of man, shows exactly the opposite of what Wild
wishes to prove, namely that good is immanent in empirical reality
and that a natural law may consequently be deduced from this reality.
Plato says, if one wishes to discern the true nature of the soul, "not as
we now behold her, marred by communion with the body and other
miseries, you must contemplate her with the eye of reason, in her
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original purity," that is to say, as she exists released from the body,
beyond empirical reality, in the transcendental realm of ideas. "Then
her beauty will be revealed." She will not appear as she does in
empirical reality where she can be and cause both good and evil.
"Then ... justice and injustice and all the things we have described
will be manifested more clearly." We must regard her as "kindred
with the immortal and eternal and divine." But that means the
nature of the soul cannot be recognized in empirical reality. Plato
actually says in Timaeus 72 that only God knows the truth concerning
the nature of the soul. If the soul is the "nature" on which Plato's
doctrine is founded, it is not the nature of empirical reality, not real
but ideal nature. And thus the basic principle of the doctrine of
natural law-obtaining norms of justice through observation of empirical reality-is fundamentally rejected by Plato himself.

VI. THE "NATURAL" SANCTIONS
The view that Plato is a proponent of the doctrine of natural law
aypaa v/o'lua are
spoken of and called "the bonds of the whole state." Wild believes
that he finds here Plato's doctrine of "unwritten laws of nature"
which "hold universally and underlie the written positive laws of
every genuinely human community." (Wild 153) But if one looks
more closely, it is hardly tenable that aypaa vajutua refer to such a
natural law. They are mentioned by the Athenian after a discussion
of "many little things, not always apparent" which occur "in private
life" and which "by reason of their smallness and frequent occurrence
there would be an unseemliness and want of propriety in making...
penal by law." On the other hand it is impossible to "be silent"
about them. It is a question of the care for pregnant women and
children under three years of age. One cannot handle these matters
with sanctions decreed by law only with unofficial "precept" and
"admonition" (Laws 788). This advice by legislators, which is not
legally binding, hardly has a general natural law as its model. At
the end of the discussion the Athenian remarks "that all the matters
which we are now describing are commonly called by the general
name of 97papa v'juua." This term is best translated "unwritten customs," not as it now and then appears, "unwritten laws." The
Athenian sets them on a par with "the laws of our ancestors" (raTplovs
VO/OIx). Of these he says "they are the bonds of the whole state, and
come in between the written laws which are or are hereafter to be
laid down; they are just ancestral customs of great antiquity, which,
if they are rightly ordered and made habitual, shield and preserve
the previously existing written law." These remarks are difficult to

seems to find some substantiation in Laws 793 where
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understand, especially because of the context of their connection with
the passage concerning care for pregnant women and new-born children. For this subject is, because of its little importance, one which
is not to be regulated by law. In any case, the basis of the laws to
which these remarks pertain is not natural law but time-honored
custom; and the process which is presented here is the codification of
customary law, not the transformation of natural law into positive
law.
The view that Plato is a proponent of the doctrine of natural law
is also based by Maguire and Wild on Plato's assumption of "natural
sanctions." That is, Wild assumes a natural law which is at once a
moral law and according to which antinatural, morally bad conduct
of man necessarily brings on the doer evil consequences. The idea
of poenae naturales, which plays a prominent part in the doctrine
of natural law, is actually found in antiquity, in a fragment from
Antiphon: 9
Whoever transgresses against legal (positive law) statutes, if it remains hidden, is spared shame and punishment ....

But whoever seeks to

violate, contrary to possibility, one of the laws of nature which have
grown together with us will find the harm no less, if it remains hidden
from all men, and no greater if all take note pf it. The damage is based
not on mere opinion, but on truth. The observation of these things is
generally made for the reason that most legal regulations are inimical
to nature.
What are the facts to which natural sanctions are bound, and of
what do these sanctions consist? The answer is: "Life and death
are subject to nature; life comes to man from the beneficial, death
from the non-beneficial." The sanctions therefore are: death as punishment, life as reward; the conditional facts are: the beneficial is that
which brings life; the non-beneficial that which brings death.
Observation of empirical reality does in fact show that certain facts,
especially certain manners of behavior bring death to man and
others conserve life. There is between these conditions and their
consequences a connection which can be described as a causal law.
But an observation of nature made without moral presuppositions
will not allow this connection to be construed as normative; that is
one cannot assume that nature commands that which preserves life
and forbids that which brings death. Only then could the causal law
be seen as a moral law. But this must be the case if legal norms are
maintained to have been deduced from nature. As we have already
shown, this is based on the projection to nature of the norm, which
presupposed as self-evident by the observer: that man ought to live
and ought not to die; and this norm is the objectification of man's
9. 2 DIELs, DIE FRAGMENTE DER VORSOIRATImR

346 (5th ed. 1935).
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subjective wish to live and not to die. So-called natural sanctions
are not sanctions immanent in empirical reality. Therefore there
are no natural sanctions. Nature knows no sanctions, since it commands and forbids nothing, and promises neither punishment nor
reward.
Maguire believes he is able to see Plato's assumption of poenae
naturales in the precept that the just man is happy and the unjust
man unhappy. (Maguire 159) Plato first defends this thesis in book
I of the Republic 354 where Socrates asserts: "Then the just soul and
the just man will live well (6 j'WMeTat), and the unjust man will live
ill ....And he who lives well (d tcv)" is blessed and happy, and who
lives ill the reverse of happy." But this is hardly more than a sophistical play on words, based on the double meaning of 6 Cv--to live
morally and to live happily. Maguire refers to the Republic 571-88.
Wild, too, quotes (Wild 143) this section of the dialogue to prove that
according to Plato the tendency to the good in every thing is realized
only gradually. "This law is enforced by inexorable natural sanctions." But Wild overlooks the fact that sanctions, and in particular
punishments, are reactions against evil conduct; and, if they are
applied to "tendencies," there must be tendencies to the evil. This
Wild denies, though not very consistently.
However, the passages from book IX of the Republic cited by
Maguire and Wild by no means contain a theory of natural sanctions.
Neither do they deal with the happiness of the just or unhappiness
of the unjust man. Rather they pertain to the tyrannically minded
man in whose soul certain immoral but innate desires prevail and
who therefore is capable of any crime. But this is only a particular
case of an unjust man. Even if Plato were to prove that the tyrannically minded man was necessarily unhappy, he would not .have proved
that every unjust man was. The remarks in question come from an
examination of various forms of government and are essentially intended to show that tyranny is a bad form of government in comparison with monarchy. The tyrannically ruled state is an unhappy
state: "A tyranny is the wretchedest form of government and the
rule of a king the happiest." (Republic 576) Plato uses here the
parallel, of which he is fond, between state and man. But he does
not reason that because the tyrannically minded man is unhappy
the tyrannically ruled state must be unhappy, but just the other way
around, that because the tyrannically ruled state is unhappy the
tyrannically minded man must be. Socrates says to Glaucon, "Let me
ask you not to forget the parallel of the individual and the State;
bearing this in mind, and glancing in turn from one to the other of
them, will you tell me their respective conditions?" (Republic 577)
It is then shown that the tyrannically ruled state is unhappy. Of
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what does its "unhappiness" consist? First of all, it is not "free" but
"enslaved." "Then if the man is like the State . . .his soul is full
of meanness and vulgarity." "Meanness and vulgarity" are explained more clearly: "And the State which is enslaved under
a tyrant is utterly incapable of acting voluntarily." "And also the
soul which is under a tyrant is least capable of doing what she
desires; there is a gadfly which goads her, and she is full of
trouble and remorse." The proposition that a tyrannically ruled
state does not do what it wants and is therefore not free is
developed further in Gorgias, beginning at 446. Socrates declares that
tyrants do what they please but not what they "will." For they do
not know what is good. Their soul is blind. One can only "will" the
good, the just. But that means one can only "will" what one ought
to will. The "real" will is the one that ought to be, in conformity
with a moral norm! So far as he is happy who is free, and he is free
who can do what he "wills," a tyrannically ruled state and therefore
a tyrannically minded man must be unhappy. Neither the one nor
the other does what he wills since he does not do what he ought to
do, the good or just. He is not happy for he is not just. Since happiness is identified with justice and unhappiness with injustice, the
thesis that the just man is happy and the unjust man unhappy runs
into empty tautology. The discussion of whether the watchmen who
rule the ideal state are happy shows quite clearly that especially the
"'happiness" of the just man consists of his justice and not of a condition which is different from just conduct and caused by it and
which therefore cannot be construed as a natural sanction or reward
for his justice. After Socrates has pictured their condition and life,
Adeimantus remarks (Republic 419) "that for their own good you are
making these people miserable"; and Socrates does not deny it. Rather
he emphasizes that it is not the intention in constructing an ideal
state to make one class particularly happy but to make the state
happy. The important thing is the happiness of the entire state.
(Republic 420-21, 519) Now, the watchmen who rule the state are
prototypes of just men. If the ideal state is a just one, it is so because
it is justly ruled. But if one examines what constitutes the "happiness" of the ideal state, he finds that it is nothing but its justice.
When in the course of picturing the tyrannical temper Plato declares that the tyrannical soul must be "full of trouble and remorse"
(Republic 577), his statement is based not on psychological analysis
but on ethical speculation. The true meaning is that a tyrannical
soul ought to be "full of trouble and remorse." There can be no
question of a natural sanction immanent in the soul or nature of the
unjust man because this speculation in no way pertains to the empirical nature of man.
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The unhappiness of a tyrannically ruled state consists also in the
State's being "poor" and "full of fear." In no other state will one find
"more of lamentation and sorrow and groaning and pain." (Republic
578) This can only mean that men living in a tyrannically ruled state
are poor and in constant fear and therefore unhappy, no matter if
they themselves are just or unjust, tyrannically or not tyrannically
minded. From this is concluded, without any examination of the
soul of a tyrannically minded man, that he "must be always poor and
insatiable ... and full of fear." (Republic 578) Such a conclusion is
quite unfounded. Plato is not so much concerned with the unhappiness of the unjust men as with the injustice of the tyrannical state.
Plato subsequently discusses the case (Republic 578-79) of a tyrannically minded man who comes to power and-it does not follow
necessarily-becomes a tyrannical ruler. He must live in constant
fear and must therefore be unhappy. Plato in fact presents this as
the result of psychological observation. If the observation is correct,
it pertains to such a rare case of immoral conduct that no conclusions
can be drawn from it for the general Platonic theory that immoral
conduct will inevitably visit the doer with natural, physical, or psychic
evil.
Moreover Plato occasionally admits that unjust men can to the
end of their days lead a life which they find happy. In Laws 899-900
the Athenian says to Cleinias, "Perhaps you have seen impious men
growing old and leaving their children's children in high offices, and
their prosperity shakes your faith"; you have observed "men by ...
criminal means from small beginnings attaining to sovereignty and
the pinnacle of greatness." But he assures us that "the fortunes of
evil and unrighteous men in private as well as public life, which
though not really happy, are wrongly counted happy in the judgment of men and are celebrated both by poets and prose writers." It
is evident here that in the thesis the just man is happy and the unjust
man unhappy Plato does not mean by "happiness" what psychological
observation of empirical reality alone could yield, a real condition of
the soul and that which men find to be happiness, the gratification
of wishes, but rather an ideal condition, that which men ought to
find happiness to be.
In the Republic, beginning at 588, the doctrine which links justice
with happiness and injustice with unhappiness is presented to show
that just action is useful, unjust action harmful to man. But how is
this assertion proved? Socrates declares as a generally recognized
principle: "Is not the noble that which subjects the beast to the man,
or rather to the god in man; and the ignoble that which subjects
the man to the beast?" "Then how would a man profit if he received
gold and silver on the condition that he was to enslave the noblest

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 14

part of him to the worst?" This is nothing else but the tautology that
gaining gold unjustly is unjust. For example, someone who gave his
son or daughter into slavery for gold would not be profited but rather
would make himself unhappy. "Eriphyle took the necklace as the
price of her husband's life, but he is taking a bribe in order to compass a worse ruin." In the legend Eriphyle is murdered by Alcmaeon,
her son, in revenge for the death of his father. But this act of revenge
is in no way a "natural" sanction, but one decreed by the social
order and imposed as a duty on the son. When Plato presumes that
he who sells his son or daughter into slavery calls up still greater evil
on himself, he is speaking of nothing other than the divine punishment which awaits the evil-doer in Hades. And these too, are not
natural sanctions, immanent in the empirical reality of nature, but
transcendental sanctions. This is clear in the Republic 618 wherein the report which the mystic person, Er, makes on his experiences
in the world beyond-the consequences of a just and unjust life on
happiness and unhappiness are discussed. Man must be capable of
distinguishing just and unjust modes of living. The choice of the
just life is the best for life and death, but one must go down to Hades
convinced of this (in Hades departed souls select their future mode
of living) in order "that there too he may be undazzled by the desire
of wealth or the other allurements of evil, lest coming upon tyrannies
and similar villainies, he do irremediable wrongs to others and suffer
yet worse himself." The evil which he will suffer is the transcendental punishment inflicted on the unjust in Hades, not poenae
naturales, not sanctions immanent in empirical reality.
Wild believes (Wild 139-40) he is able to demonstrate a doctrine of
natural law based on the existence of natural sanctions particularly
in Laws 714-16. These remarks, he says, are "a clear expression of
Plato's conception of a moral law founded on the very nature of
things and thus enforced by natural sanctions." "Disobedience is inexorably punished in the long run by privation and destruction." Here
the question is in fact "what is to be the standard of just and unjust,"
"the best way of expressing the natural definition of justice" (Tv
Ou'aE opov roy 8ucalou). The question is put more precisely (Laws 715):

Should the state be entrusted to power or to reasonable insight, that
is, should the content of law be determined by mere power or by
reason? In answering this question the Athenian says of states in
which the government relies solely on power, "Now, according to our
view, such governments are not polities at all, nor are laws right
which are passed for the good of particular classes and not for the
good of the whole state. States which have such laws are not polities
but parties, and their notions of justice are simply unmeaning." How
does one recognize that a law is made in the interest of the whole
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state and not merely in the interest of a particular class? The legislator always maintains that the former is so. Plato does not go into
this question. But the Athenian says: "I say this, because I am going
to assert that we must not entrust the government in your state to
any one because he is rich, or because he possesses any other advantage, such as strength, or stature, or again birth: but he who is
most obedient to the laws of the state, he shall win the palm; and
to him who is victorious in* the first degree should be given the
highest office and chief ministry of the gods; and the second to him
who bears the second palm, and on a similar principle shall all the
other offices be assigned to those who come next in order." Those
whom one usually calls "rulers," one must call "servants of the law."
"I certainly believe that upon such service or ministry depends the
well- or ill-being of the state." This can only mean that the application of laws should be entrusted to men who are willing to observe
them truly. But this is not an answer to the question of a "natural
definition of justice." It does not answer how laws should be made,
what their content should be, and which laws should be issued, but
rather who should apply the established laws. The answer is selfevident, since one cannot entrust the application of laws to those who
will not adhere to them. If, however, obedience to established laws
is the most important thing, then this legal philosophy amounts to a
demand for a state in which the government, its subordinate organs,
and the courts in their functions are bound to laws, to general legal
norms-a demand which has nothing to do with natural law and
which can be made on the basis of a strict legal positivism. That is
in fact the case here, for further on we read: "For that state in which
the law is subject and has no authority, I perceive to be on the highway to ruin; but I see that the state in which the law is above the
rulers, and the rulers are the inferiors of the law, has salvation, and
every blessing which the gods can confer." That law must be master
in the state and not dependent on the power of the ruler does not
mean, according to the above, that law cannot be made by the ruler
himself. The government can be subject and bound to a law which
it itself has made; it can apply it strictly without arbitrary exceptions.
If the end which the Athenian predicts for a state where authorities
are not subject to the laws is to be interpreted as a sanction, then
the sanction is the consequence not of antinatural conduct, but of
illegal action by the government against existing positive laws. And
this sanction is not a natural one, immanent in empirical reality, but
one imposed by the gods, a transcendental sanction. If Plato had had
a doctrine of natural law in mind, he would not have placed heavy
emphasis on the observance of legislated laws, but on the correspondence of the content of laws to the norms immanent in natural reality.
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But there is no trace of that to be found here.
The "rule of law" has been discussed already in Laws 190. There
the Athenian says that it is a justifiable demand that parents should
rule over children, "that the noble should rule over the ignoble,"
"that the elder should rule and the younger obey," "that slaves should
be ruled, and their masters rule," and then "that the stronger shall
rule, and the weaker be ruled." To this Cleinias replies: "That is a
rule not to be disobeyed." The Athenian in no way contradicts him
but says: "Yes, and a rule which prevails very widely among all
creatures, and is according to nature, as the Theban poet Pindar once
said." But he adds as the sixth kind of rule "that the wise should
lead and command, and the ignorant follow and obey; and yet, 0
thou most wise Pindar, as I should reply to him, this surely is not
contrary to nature, but according to nature, being the rule of law
over willing subjects and not a rule of compulsion." (In his poem
Pindar says of the rule of law: it is "king over all that is mortal or
immortal," and "exercises boldly the greatest power with a mighty
hand.") One may regard as the laws which should prevail in the
state those which are voluntarily obeyed; and one may assume that
these are the laws decreed in the interest of the entire state and
not of a single class. If Plato has previously declared the rule of
the stronger to be according to nature, he has only done so because
he means by the "stronger"-as in Gorgias 490-the judicious. But
how can one assume that the ignorant who have no insight into what
is in the interest of the entire state will voluntarily obey such laws?
Laws based on the voluntary obedience of those whose conduct they
govern, because they are in accordance with nature in general
and the nature of man in particular, do not need sanctions. But the
laws which Plato suggests in Laws provide for Draconic punishment
for those who refuse obedience. The "nature" with which the rule
of law is in accordance and which one voluntarily obeys cannot be
real nature; it can only be an ideal nature. This "nature" is none
else than God, and the "natural law" above the law of the state is
"divine law."
Directly after his prediction that a state whose government acts
against legislated laws will reap ill, and the state whose authorities
are subject to these laws will reap good from the gods, the Athenian
says that the citizens of the state to be founded must be warned as
follows: "God, as the old tradition declares, holding in His hand the
beginning, middle and end of all that is, travels according to His
nature in a straight line towards the accomplishment of His end.
Justice always accompanies Him, and is the punisher of those who
fall short of the divine law. To justice, he who would be happy holds
fast, and follows in her company with all humility and order." But
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whoever, swollen with pride and insolence, thinks that he needs
neither guide nor leader, "but is himself able to be the guide of
others," and brings everything into a state of confusion, "he pays a
penalty which justice cannot but approve, and is utterly destroyed,
and his family and city with him." "Every man," Cleinias says,
"ought to make up his mind that he will be one of the followers of
God; there can be no doubt of that." (Laws 716) The question here
is not so much one of the destruction of the state as of the individual
punishment which threatens him who does not obey divine law. Not
to obey divine law is synonymous with not to be "one of the followers
of God." The "old tradition" to which Plato refers here is a precept
of Orphic religion. The "punisher" of those who fall short of the
divine law is in Orphic belief a court in the beyond, as Plato portrays
it in Gorgias 523-24. The punishments imposed here are exactly the
opposite of poenae naturales. It is typically Platonic that this religion is placed in the service of the state and that they are threatened
with divine punishment who rebel against the ruler and leader of
the state and thus create confusion. Quite characteristic is what
Plato says of "what life is agreeable to God, and becoming in His
followers." It is that life "expressed ... in the old saying 'like agrees
with like, with measure measure' "; but "the measure of all things
is God." He who is agreeable to God must endeavor-with moderate
conduct-to be similar to God. That is, he follows God who acts as
God wills. This is an empty tautology. The expression of conduct
"agreeable to God," "the mark at which we ought to aim" is contained in the "conclusion, which is also the noblest and truest of all
sayings,-that for the good man to offer sacrifice to the Gods, and hold
converse with them by means of prayers and offerings and every
kind of service, is the noblest and the best of all things, and also
the most conducive to a happy life." He will reach the goal of "service" best who complies with the principle "that next after the Olympian Gods and the Gods of the State, honor should be given to the
Gods below.... Next to these Gods a wise man will do service to the

demons or spirits, and then to the heroes, and after them will follow
the private and ancestral Gods, who are worshipped as the law prescribes in the places which are sacred to them . . ." and so forth.

The divinity which in accordance with nature and accompanied by.
justice wends its eternal way and makes stern judgment proves
finally to be the gods of the Greek state religion; "divine law" is the
regulations of this religion. When Plato raises the question of the
natural definition of justice, he means-as the following showsnothing more than the proper, appropriate legislation; and the proper,
appropriate legislation is, in the opinion of the Athenian, who is
Plato's mouthpiece, a legislation which guarantees the state religion
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and in particular the cult which the state religion prescribes. That
is the only tangible result of this passage from Laws, which Wild
interprets as the clear expression of the Platonic doctrine of natural
law. It has nothing to do with natural law. When Plato uses here the
phrase "according to nature" (Kara 4so5Lv), it means-as it often does
in English-nothing else but "appropriate," or "correct," or "moral,"
with no thought of any normative function of nature, even though
the origin of this formula may lie in such a concept.
In another passage which Wild cites (Wild 139) as proof of a Platonic doctrine of natural law-Laws 870-the formula means nothing
else. It is set forth here that the longing for wealth is highly
pernicious, that it leads to bloody murders, and that to avoid this
"the truth.., should be spoken in all states-namely, that riches are
for the sake of the body,-as the body is for the sake of the soul. They
are good, and wealth is intended by nature (7re'vxe)

to be for the

sake of them, and is therefore inferior to them both, and third in
order in excellence." Wild sees here the assertion that "this order of
subordination exists by nature." (Wild 139) The essential thing in
this subordination is that the welfare of the soul comes before the
welfare of the body. The welfare of the soul, according to Plato,
consists in morality. That the body must serve the soul means only
that man must act morally. The conclusion from the subordination
above is that one "should seek to be rich justly and temperately," that
is, one must use wealth in conformity with the norms of morality. If
this is the proper disposition of wealth, then "nature" means in effect
morality, and not empirical reality. In this very connection Plato
uses the formula KaGra 'oula in a way which excludes the concept of
"natural" sanctions, i.e., sanctions determined by causal laws and
scientifically ascertainable by observation of empirical reality. The
Athenian proposes "a prelude concerning crimes of violence in general;" and says: "I must not omit to mention a tradition which is
firmly believed by many, and has been received by them from those
who are learned in the mysteries: they say that such deeds will be
punished in the world below, and also that when the perpetrators
return to this world they will pay the natural penalty (&Va)Ka~ov dvat
which is due to the sufferer, and end their
V Ka4p'a~v &,qv &7itu)
lives in like manner by the hand of another." The "natural" punishments are those in Hades and those which in the transmigration of
souls of the Orphic-Pythagorean mystery-religions, threaten one after
the rebirth. The necessity (avayKq) according to which these punishments occur is not that of a causal natural law, but the absolute
validity of the norm of retribution established by the divine will.
In Book X of Laws (904-05) there is a passage in which Plato ex-
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pressly refers to a legal order above positive law. According to this
order there is after death a change of place in which the principle
of retribution is realized. The souls of good or virtuous men are rewarded by being carried to a place "which is perfect in holiness." The
souls of the evil go to Hades where they undergo the just punishment
of the gods; after their rebirth they must suffer the same evil which
in their previous life they have committed. The Athenian then cites
a passage in the Odyssey (XIX, 43): "Thus wills the law (8&q) of
the Olympic gods." This divine legal order has been elevated by
its founders above all other legal orders. No one can boast "of having
resisted it victoriously." The Athenian maintains the existence of
this divine legal order of law to prove that there are gods and
that they are concerned about men. If this divine legal order is
designated as a natural one, then "nature" does not mean empirical
reality-as in a true doctrine of natural law-but a transcendental
divinity. Such a doctrine is not positivistic, but idealistic and
thoroughly theological. It is, however, not a doctrine of natural law
in the sense of a realistic doctrine of natural law based on empirically
observable facts of sensibly perceptible reality which attempts to
deduce the just norms of human conduct from this reality.
VII. TnE "NATURAL" ORDER OF LAW iN PLATO'S PHILosoPHy
Plato says expressly that this reality given to our senses is not
his "nature." In Laws 889-90 he comes to the distinction of the
Sophists between things which are praiseworthy (KaXa) by nature
(Ov'rac) and things which are praiseworthy by law (v ')
and to the
sophistic thesis that there is no law which is just by nature, "that
legislation is entirely a work of art [not of nature] and is based on
assumptions which are not true." The Athenian rejects this view
because "in this way the young fall into impieties, under the idea
that the gods are not such as the law bids them imagine; and hence
arise contentions, these philosophers inviting them to lead a true
life according to nature, that is, to live in real dominion over others,
and not in legal subjection to them." It is apparent here that Plato
identifies the view that there is no law by nature with the view
that there is no law established by the gods. Denial of a natural law
is a denial of the existence of the gods. True nature is God. This
becomes even clearer in the following passage where the Athenian
discusses the view of the materialistic Sophists that originally there
were only sensibly perceptible bodies; the sensibly imperceptible
soul came later. Since by "nature" they mean that which originated
first, they assume that only the physical world is "nature." The
Athenian counters this view by saying that not the body but the
soul and "the things which are of soul's kindred" are "prior to that
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which is hard and soft and heavy and light," or to "fire or air," that
is, prior to sensibly perceptible reality, to "nature and works of
nature, which however is a wrong term for men to apply to them."
That means the term "nature" must correctly be ascribed to the soul
and the soul's kindred. (Laws 892) By "the soul's kindred" only divinity can be meant. Divinity-not sensibly perceptible reality-is
"nature" in the true sense of the word and as such is the "chief author
of their (bodies') change and transpositions." Divinity is natura
naturans,the prima causa, God. Wild himself concedes this when he
believes he finds in Plato's doctrine of natural law "a rational living
principle of natural order." This principle, he admits, is God. (Wild
139)
In Gorgias 507-08, where the problem of the relation between
4,,vcl
and vopos,, between nature and law, is in the forefront, Socrates
says that a man into whose soul justice has not entered "is the friend
neither of God nor man, for he is incapable of communion, and he
who is incapable of communion is also incapable of friendship." This
he supports with a saying of "philosophers"-that is, of the Pythagoreans---"that communion and friendship and orderliness and temperance and justice bind together heaven and earth and gods and men,
and that this universe is therefore called Cosmos or order, not disorder or misrule." This is a normative interpretation of nature
characteristic of all theological-metaphysical speculation. It is noteworthy that the normative order according to which nature is interpreted in theological-metaphysical speculation is established by a
superhuman transcendental authority. From this presupposed natural
order it follows that the legal order of human conduct should correspond to cosmic order, and that the justice which is realized in the
legal order has as its model the justice of the natural order. In his
attempt to demonstrate a Platonic doctrine of natural law Maguire
refers to this passage in Gorgias. (Maguire 160-72) He says that this
dialogue "seems to imply that the physical universe is, in some sense,
a norm for the moral conduct of men and that, in particular, it
embodies the ethico-political norms of measure and orderliness, fraternity, self-restraint and justice." (Maguire 162) In Gorgias Plato
"establishes the physical universe (rather its orderliness) as the
criterion of Right." (Maguire 163) But Maguire emphasizes correctly
that it is not the sensibly perceptible empirical reality of the cosmos
but a reality behind it which is the model: "It is never the visible
universe which is to be imitated, but the Reality behind it." (Maguire
172) This reality "behind" empirical reality is Platonic divinity.
It is curious that in the very dialogue which more than any other
concerns the just establishment of positive law in a state-that is,
Laws-Plato makes no use of his doctrine of ideas which is devoted
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above all to the problem of justice. And in the Republic where the
problem of justice is the center of attention and where apparently for
this reason, Plato presents his doctrine of ideas, he applies it only
vaguely to positive law, which plays here a subordinate role. In the
analogy of the cave in Book VII Socrates says there is nothing "surprising in one who passes from divine contemplations to the evil
state of man, misbehaving himself in a ridiculous manner; if, while
his eyes are blinking and before he has become accustomed to the
surrounding darkness, he is compelled to fight in courts of law, or
in other places, about the images or the shadows of images of justice,
and is endeavoring to meet the conceptions of those who have never
yet seen absolute justice." (Republic 517) In the courts of the state
which exist in social reality there is applied the positive law made by
men who have not seen the idea of justice. This law is only a shadow
of justice. In the ideal state however the philosopher-rulers, to whom
jurisdiction is entrusted (Republic 433), have seen the idea of the
good, which includes justice. (Republic 490, 519, 540) Plato is not
very clear about the law which they make. It seems that the governmental activity of the philosopher-rulers is expressed more in the
form of individual decisions than in the enactment of laws, i.e., general
norms. Certain remarks in Book IV (425) indicate this. Here Plato
declares himself against legislation, particularly about "the business
of the agora, and the ordinary dealings between man and man, or
again about agreements with artisans; about insult and injury, or
the commencement of actions, and the appointment of juries . . .
there may also arise questions about any impositions and extractions
of market and harbor dues which may be required, and in general
about the regulations of markets, police, harbors, and the like." Plato
there is no need to impose laws
justifies his position: "I think ...
about them on good men; what regulations are necessary they will
find out soon enough themselves." By "good men" probably the
rulers are meant. One may assume that what Plato says of legislation in The Statesman 294 applies to the ideal state: "The best
thing of all is not that the law should rule, but that a man should
rule, supposing him to have wisdom and royal power.. . . Because
the law does not perfectly comprehend what is noblest and most just
for all and therefore cannot enforce what is best. The differences of
men and actions, and the endless irregular movements of human
things, do not admit of any universal and simple rule. And no art
But
whatsoever can lay down a rule which will last for all time ....
1
one."'
make
to
striving
the law is always
10. This view seems to contradict a later remark on the arts of the judge
to the effect that the righteous judge only decides the dealings of men with
one another "to be just or unjust in accordance with the standard which he
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The model after which positive law is to be fashioned-whether in
general or individual norms-are not some norms immanent in the
nature of empirical reality, but the idea of justice which is contained
in the idea of the good. And this idea is so transcendent that it lies
not only beyond empirical being which is only apparent but beyond
true being as well and therefore beyond the rationally discernible.
(Republic 509) Only in a state of religious ecstasy can it be glimpsed
by a few who have been selected by divine grace. (Epistle VII 341)11
In its application to positive law Plato's doctrine of ideas is the exact
opposite of a doctrine of natural law founded on observable facts of
empirical reality.
receives from the king and legislator." (Statesman 305) But this statement,
as the following passage shows, designates only the limits of the judicial
function: "Then the inference is that the power of the judge is not royal,
but only the power of a guardian of the law which ministers to the
royal power."
11. See the essay Platonic Jutice in MY WHAT IS JUSTrICE? 82 (1957).

